A model of actors and grey failures

Laura Bocchi, Simon Thompson, Laura Voinea Julien Lange

University of Kent Royal Holloway, University of London

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Context

- Software execution is affected by unpredictability
- Formal models:
 - include reliability primitives e.g., exceptions [Fowler et al. POPL'19], timeouts [Laneve, Zavattaro, FoSSaCS'05][Lopez, Perez, WS-FM'11] ...
 - include link/node failures [Francalanza, Hennessy, CONCUR'05] [Adameir, Peters, Nestmann, FORTE'17]...
 - . . .
- Models mostly focus on fail-stop failures

• Programming practice: handling unpredictability with timeouts, exceptions, supervisors, ...

Grey failures



[Gunavi et al. ACM Transactions on Storage'18]



- Multiple "patterns" of failure
- No precise awareness of the state of health of the system
 - A component appears to be working but is experiencing issues
 - Differential observation



Contribution

- A formal framework to study the ability of a system to cope with failures
 - a formal model of actors and grey failures



link delay link failure (message loss) node delay node failure (state and mailbox reset)

• a definition of resilience and recoverability, based on behavioural equivalence





Systems: the main ingredients

- Actor-based systems : we borrow mailboxes + timeouts
- Mailboxes -> expressive communication model e.g., many producers-one consumer
 - asynchrony + pattern-matching + selective receive





(**item**, m3)

e.g., [Mostrous, Vasconcelos, COORDINATION'11]



Systems

R ::= n[P](M)(t) $\mid R \mid R$ $\mid 0$

 $P ::= ?\{p_i . P_i\}_{i \in I} \text{ after } P \qquad patter \\ patter \\ \vdots \\ patter \\ patter \\ after \\ n \rightarrow P \\ end \\ | \mu t . P | t | 0$

Failures

$\Delta: \mathbb{N} \times \mathcal{N} \cup (\mathcal{N} \times \mathcal{N}) \mapsto \{ \mathsf{T}, \bot, \pm \}$



Producer - consumer

instantaneous time www

	p	[S	leep.	!c	i	ter	n.	0]	(0)		C [
~~~~>	р	[	!	c <b>ite</b>	m.	0	] ( (	0)		с [	?	item
<b></b>	p	[	0	](0)		С	[	?i	ten	n ->	0	afte
~~~~>	р	[	0	](0)		С	[	?i	.ten	l ->	0	aftei
	p	0		С	[?i	tem	_>	0	after
	р	0		c[0]	(0)			

average network latency = 1

?item -> 0 after 3 Cf](0) time 0 -> 0 after 2 Cf](0) time 1 r 2 Cf](0) || sleep.(c,p,item) r 1 Cf](0) || (c,p,item) time 2

r 1 Cf](item)





Producer - consumer with link slowdown

• Reduction on (R, Δ)

R =	p	[sl	eep.	!c	it	en	n. ()]	(0)		с [
~~~~>	p	[!c	iten	n. ()]	(())	(2 [?i	tem
	p	0		С	[?i1	tem	->	0	afte
~~~~~	p	[	0	](0)		С	[	?it	em	->	0	afte
~~~~~	p	[	0	](0)		С	[	Cf	] ( (	))		(p,c

- $\Delta(\mathbf{p}, \mathbf{c})(t) = \begin{cases} \pm & \text{if } t \in \{1\} \\ \top & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$
 - ?item -> 0 after 3 Cf](0) time 0
 - -> 0 after 2 Cf](0) time 1
 - er 2 Cf](0) || sleep.(p,c,item)
 - r 1 Cf](0) || sleep.(p,c,item)
 - ,item)

time 3





Behavioural equivalence

Time-abstract weak barbed bisimulation:

 $(R_1, \Delta_1) \approx (R_2, \Delta_2)$ implies:

1) If $(R_1, \Delta_1) \rightarrow (R'_1, \Delta_1)$ then $(R_2, \Delta_2) \rightarrow (R'_2, \Delta_2)$ and $(R'_1, \Delta_1) \approx (R'_2, \Delta_2)$ 2) If $R_1 \downarrow x$ then $(R_2, \Delta_2) \rightarrow (R'_2, \Delta_2)$ and $R'_2 \downarrow x$

Barbs: $n[!\{n_i m_i \cdot P_i\}_{i \in I}](M)(t) \downarrow !n_i m_i$ $(n_1, n_2, m)(t) \downarrow !n_2 m$ $n[?{p_i . P_i}_{i \in i} \text{ after } P](M)(t) \downarrow ?np_i$

Example

 $R = p[sleep.!c item.0](0) \mid c[?item->0 after 3 0](0) (R, \Delta) \approx (R, T)$ $(R, \top) \to * \mathbf{p} 0 || \mathbf{c} 0$ $(R, \Delta) \rightarrow^* \mathbf{p} 0 \mid | (\mathbf{p}, \mathbf{c}, \text{item}) \mid | \mathbf{c}0$

for all $i \in I$

for all $i \in I$



Resilience

- An initial cursed system (R, Δ) is **resilient** if $(R, \Delta) \approx (R, T)$

$$R_1 = p[sleep.!c item.0](0) || c[?item.0]$$

 $R_3 = p \ [\mu t.sleep.!c item.t](0) || p'[\mu t.sleep.!c item.t](0)$ $|| c[\mu t.?item -> 0 after 3 t](0)$

 Bisimulation to check the ability of a system to preserve behaviour despite failures • $p[sleep.!c item.0](0) \mid c[?item->0 after 3 0](0) is not resilient (wrt <math>\Delta$) $(R_1, \Delta) \approx (R_1, \mathsf{T})$ m > 0 after 4 0](0) $R_2 = p \text{ [sleep.!c item.0](0) || c[?item->0 after 3 (?item->0 after 3 0)](0)}$ $(R_2, \Delta) \approx (R_2, \top)$ $(R_3, \Delta) \approx (R_3, \mathsf{T})$

Recoverability

- Resilience is too strong to capture e.g., retry strategies
 - p[µt.sleep.!c item.?{ok.0, retry.t}](0) ||

• An initial cursed system (R,Δ) is *n*-recoverable if there exists R'such that $(R, \Delta) \to (R', \Delta)$, time(R') = n, and $(R, T) \approx (R', \Delta)$

Finite thanks to a non-zenoness requirement

 $c[\mu t.?item->!p ok.0 after 3.!p retry.t](0)$

Augmentations

- $R_2 = \mathbf{p[sleep.!c item.0](0)}$ resilient wrt Δ c[?item->0 after 3 (?item->0 after 3 0)](0)
 - R is an augmentation of R if (transparency) $(\overline{R}, T) \approx (R, T)$
 - Moreover, \overline{R} is **preserving** if for all *n* and Δ , (R, Δ) is n-recoverable implies (\overline{R}, Δ) is *n*-recoverable

• We want to assess resilience/recoverability when **improving** it with recovery strategies $R = p[sleep.!c item.0](0) || c[?item->0 after 3 0](0) not resilient wrt <math>\Delta$

(**improvement**) There exists *n* and Δ s.t. (\overline{R}, Δ) is n-recoverable and (R, Δ) is not



Hiding

- Hiding nodes is not enough (too coarse)

Scoped barbs:

- N is a finite set of elements $\ln p$ or 2np
- $R \downarrow_N ?np$ if $R \downarrow 2np$
- $R \downarrow_N ?nm$ if $R \downarrow 2np$

Augmentations may add actions e.g., circuit breakers, ... so how about hiding?

 $2np \notin N$ and

implies $!np \vdash_{match} !nm \quad \forall !np \in N$

A characterisation of failures

- Fundamentals of fault-tolerant distributed computing in asynchronous environments [Gartner 99]
- Simulation relations for fault-tolerance [Demasi, Castro, Maibaum, Aguirre]
- Fault-tolerance:

 - masking (safety+liveness) : $(R, \Delta) \approx (R, T)$ • fail-safe (safety) : $(R, \Delta) \leq (R, T)$ • non-masking (liveness) : $(R, \Delta) \gtrsim (R, T)$, n-recoverability, ...

Conclusion & future work

- Evaluation of recovery strategies reduced to a bisimulation problem
 - resilience, n-recoverability as time-abstract weak barbed bisimulation
 - also augmentation but with existential & universal quantification on n and Δ
- Open questions
 - automated checking and choice of test suites of failures
 - relationships with session types and use in subtyping



• A model for studying grey failures in actor models (mailboxes + timeouts)

Thank you!